Dr Anurug Chakma
Has the Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti (PCJSS) “sold out” the movement and “betrayed” the Jumma people by signing the Chittagong Hill Tracts Accord (1997)? Is the PCJSS the only rebel group that has given up the armed struggle and negotiated with the government? Would no other rebel group in the world have done the same? In this piece, I challenge some of the popular myths surrounding the CHT Accord and show why the PCJSS’s decision to negotiate was not a betrayal, but a strategic move, using two major global datasets on peace processes: the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Peace Agreement Dataset Version 22.1 and the Peace Accord Matrix (PAM) Version 1.5.
01. Was it a betrayal of the PCJSS signing the CHT Accord with the government?
PCJSS is not alone in the world. Diverse rebel groups, even militarily stronger than the PCJSS, from Aceh to El Salvador, South Sudan to the Philippines, have signed peace agreements. Like other resistance movements worldwide, the PCJSS has followed a global norm of seeking peace through negotiation. Signing an agreement is neither surrender nor betrayal. The PCJSS did what many globally recognized movements have done. The figure below offers clear evidence of how common such agreements are.
Source: UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset Version 22.1.
Between 1975 and 2021, 374 peace agreements were signed worldwide, with Asia-Pacific accounting 66, including the CHT Accord in 1997. This shows that the PCJSS was one among many armed movements globally that negotiated with the governments. To label that act as betrayal is not only ahistorical, but deeply misleading.
02. Was it a rational choice for both parties?
The Zartman’s ripeness theory suggests that a “ripe moment” for conflict resolution emerges when both parties realize that one-sided military victory is unattainable and the continuation of the conflict is politically and economically costly. From the PCJSS side, it was not possible to militarily defeat Bangladesh’s large, well-equipped, and professionally trained military with approximately 2,000 armed cadres. Conversely, despite its superior strength, the Bangladeshi army was unable to eliminate the guerrilla resistance. The prolonged conflict attracted domestic and international criticism of the Bangladeshi state. Against this backdrop, the CHT Accord represented a rational and mutually beneficial outcome, a win-win solution for both parties.
03. Is the PCJSS the only rebel group involved in a territorial conflict that signed a peace agreement with the government?
The PCJSS is not alone. The red bars representing territorial conflicts appear across many years. Around the world, many rebel groups engaged in territorial conflicts (e.g., India, Senegal, Philippines, Niger, Croatia, Mali, Northern Ireland, and Papua New Guinea) have signed peace agreements with their governments. The PCJSS’s decision reflects a broader global trend.
Source: UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset Version 22.1.
In fact, the CHT Accord was one of only 77 full peace agreements, also called comprehensive peace agreements, signed globally between 1975 and 2021, aimed at resolving the entire conflict incompatibility.
Source: UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset Version 22.1.
04. Has the PCJSS “sold out” the movement in exchange for material benefits (e.g., accepting positions in the CHT Regional Council)? Isn’t this political power- sharing?
Critics often accuse the PCJSS of betraying the Jumma cause by accepting positions in the CHT Regional Council and Hill District Councils, as if participation in state institutions amounts to personal enrichment. But this allegation confuses political integration with material co- optation. Drawing on global peace agreement literature, such arrangements are widely recognized as forms of political power-sharing, not sell-outs. In his article, Why Political Power-Sharing Agreements Lead to Enduring Peaceful Resolution of Some Civil Wars, but Not Others?, published in the International Studies Quarterly (ISQ), Mukherjee (2006: 480) defines political power-sharing as concessions, such as cabinet berths, ministerial portfolios, legislative seats, and bureaucratic positions, that are offered to insurgent leaders and/or allow insurgent groups to participate in democratic politics. He also shows that political power-sharing arrangements were offered in 61 of 111 civil wars (54.9%) fought between 1944 and 1999 (Mukerjee, 2006). Table 1 provides a list of some political power-sharing agreements (1944- 1999). From India to El Salvador and Northern Ireland to Nepal, post-conflict agreements frequently provide institutional roles to former rebels as part of a transition from armed struggle to democratic negotiation. Why do governments offer power-sharing arrangements to insurgents? In their book, Crafting Peace: Power-Sharing Institutions and the Negotiated Settlement of Civil Wars, published in 2007 by the Pennsylvania State University Press,
Caroline A. Hartzell and Matthew Hoddie find that power-sharing arrangements are more likely to endure peace. The CHT Accord followed this global norm. Hence, the claim that the PCJSS “sold out” is more rhetorical than real and deeply misleading.
Table 1: List of some civil wars and political power-sharing agreements, 1944-1999.
Source: Mukerjee (2006: 481-482).
05. The PCJSS is criticized for surrendering arms. Isn’t this DDR?
Is the PCJSS the only rebel group that has surrendered its arms? The answer is “NO”. Decades of peace agreement research show that disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) is an essential component of post-conflict transitions. In their article, Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration in Peace Agreements (1975-2021): Introducing the Dataset, published in the Journal of Peace Research, Palik et al. (2025) find that 47% of all peace agreements globally include at least one DDR provision. From Tajikistan and Uganda to the Philippines and Colombia, DDR has been central to the peace process. Consider Colombia, where over 220,000 people were killed and 5.7 million displaced (Centro Nacional de Memoria Hist rica, 2013); the peace deal required FARC fighters to disarm, dissolve their military structures, and reintegrate into society. The modalities of disarmament vary. In some countries like India and Bangladesh, rebel forces surrendered arms directly to the government, while in others, such as Colombia and Aceh, DDR was facilitated by international actors like the UN or EU. To criticize the PCJSS for laying down arms under the 1997 CHT Accord is to misunderstand the global norm: DDR is not surrender, but a cornerstone of peacebuilding.
06. The CHT Accord does not have deadlines. But haven’t many peace agreements succeeded without deadlines?
It is true that some landmark peace agreements, such as the 2005 Helsinki MoU between the Government of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement, the Ohrid Framework Agreement (2001) in North Macedonia, the Bougainville Peace Agreement (2001), and the Good Friday Agreement (1998) in Northern Ireland, incorporated detailed timelines for implementing specific provisions. However, the absence of deadlines in the CHT Accord is not inherently a flaw, nor is it unusual in global peace practice. Several high-implementation peace agreements like the Interim Constitution Accord in South Africa (1993), with a 92% implementation rate, and the General Agreement on Peace in Tajikistan (1997), with 75% implementation did not include rigid timelines. Conversely, some agreements that included clear deadlines saw lower implementation rates, such as the 1996 Mindanao Final Agreement (59.72%) and the 2001 Agreement for Reform and Civil Concord in Djibouti (51.85%). These examples show that deadlines alone do not guarantee success. What matters more is sustained political will, institutional capacity, and public accountability. Hence, the primary responsibility for delayed or non-implementation lies with the Bangladeshi state, not with the absence of deadlines in the Accord itself.
07. Critics say the Accord failed because there’s no third- party guarantor. But haven’t many accords worked without third parties?
No doubt, many successful peace agreements, such as the Luena Memorandum of Understanding (2002) in Angola, the Bougainville Peace Agreement (2001) in Papua New Guinea, and the Chapultepec Peace Accords (1992) in El Salvador, involved third-party facilitation or verification. However, the absence of a third-party guarantor in the CHT Accord is certainly a limitation, but it is not the main reason for stalled implementation. Numerous peace accords have succeeded without international guarantees, provided there was genuine political will, active civic engagement, and institutional commitment to reform. For instance, agreements like the Good Friday Agreement (1998) in Northern Ireland and the Abuja Accord (1998) in Guinea-Bissau were almost fully implemented without international guarantors. Even closer to home, the Mizo Accord (1986), one of India’s most durable peace settlements, was signed without any third-party intervention.
To sum up, blaming the PCJSS for the non-implementation of the CHT Accord is misplaced. The primary responsibility lies with the Bangladeshi state, which has failed to uphold its commitments. This is not a failure of our movement; it is a failure of the state itself. In doing so, the state has not only undermined the peace process but also laid the legal and moral foundation for future resistance movement in the CHT.
Dr Anurug Chakma holds a PhD in Political Science from the School of Politics & International Relations (SPIR) at Australian National University (ANU), an MSc in Governance and Development from the University of Antwerp, and Bachelor’s and Master’s degrees in Peace and Conflict Studies from the University of Dhaka. Currently, he is a Research Fellow in the School of Regulation and Global
Governance (RegNet) at ANU. Previously, he was a Lecturer and Assistant Professor in the Department of Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Dhaka. his research examines civil wars, peace processes, Indigenous rights, migration and diaspora humanitarianism, employing qualitative, quantitative, and computational methods, including Natural Language Processing (NLP) and machine learning. He can be reached out at anurug.chakma@anu.edu.au. His personal profile is available here: https://anurugchakma.com/.
